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Recent asset pricing studies demonstrate the relevance of incorporating coskewness in asset pricing modan 40 yea
ortfolio management remains largely unresolved.
nce measures proposed by Treynor (1965), Sharpe
968) were developed assuming a normal distribu
uring the 1970s, others realized that these perfor
requires higher returns. For those unfamiliar with coskewness, an
asset with negative coskewness is an asset that, when incorporated
into a portfolio, adds negative skewness, increasing the probability
of obtaining undesirable extreme values (in the left tail of the1. Introduction
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(1966), Jensen (1
tion of returns. D
mance measures did notels, and illustrate how this component helps to explain the time variation of ex ante market risk premi
ums. This paper analyzes the role of coskewness in mutual fund performance evaluation and finds
evidence that adding a coskewness factor is economically and statistically significant. It documents that
coskewness is sometimes managed and shows persistence of the coskewness policy over time. One of the
most striking results is that many negative (positive) alpha funds, measured relative to the CAPM risk
adjustments, would be reclassified as positive (negative) alpha funds using a model with coskewness.
Therefore, performance ranking based on risk adjusted returns without considering coskewness could
generate an erroneous classification. Moreover, some fund characteristics, such as turnover ratio or cat
egory, are related to the likelihood of managing coskewness.
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rs of research, the problem of how to
systematic risk is higher (lower) and the coskewness risk is lower
(higher). The negative price of risk in the second component indi
cates that investors dislike assets with negative coskewness thatevaluate fund performance accurately distribution).
because the distribution of fund returns was not Gaussian. Thus,
Klemkosky (1973) and Ang and Chua (1979) demonstrated that
ignoring the third moment of the return distribution would gener
ate a bias in the performance evaluation. This bias could affect
Given this agreement regarding the importance of higher mo
ments from both the mutual fund and asset pricing literatures, re
cent studies have started to develop new performance measures.
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ainvestors directly by leading them to create portfolios with a sub
optimal asset allocation.1
From the asset pricing literature, several authors also point ou
the convenience of using models with higher moments. Kraus an
Litzenberger (1976) document the importance of considering th
third moment (skewness) of returns. They develop a model i
which investors are compensated for holding systematic risk an
coskewness risk, requiring a higher (lower) return whenever th
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1 Along the same lines, other authors such as Prakash and Bear (1986) or Lelan
(1999) have developed performance measures incorporating skewness, and Stephen
and Proffitt (1991) generalize the performance measure to account for any number
moments All these results indicate that ignoring higher moments could have
significant impact on the performance rankings of these fundsshort selling, and investment in illiquid assets, it seems clear that
return distributions will be non normal and that therefore these
measures will have a significant effect (see Ranaldo and Favre,
2005; Ding and Shawky, 2007). It is less evident that these mea
sures also generate changes in the performance of commonmutual
funds unable to use those strategies.2 Moreno and Rodríguez (2006)
have taken the first step of introducing coskewness in mutual fund
evaluation for the Spanish case. They find some performance differ
ences when these new measures are taken into consideration.
The major contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evi
dence about the role of coskewness in evaluating mutual funds.
This evidence is not yet addressed in the published literature. It
2 It must be noted that fund managers could use, for example, derivatives (see
Koski and Pontiff, 1999; Frino et al , 2009), biasing the distribution of fund returns to
the left or right and generating coskewness in the return distribution
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Siis provided by examining: (a) the changes in the average fund per
formance; (b) the variations in the ranking of mutual fund manag
ers; (c) the relationships between characteristics such as portfolio
turnover, size, category, and coskewness management; and (d) the
possibility that some fund managers may profit from the coskew
ness spread. Hereafter, ‘‘managing coskewness” refers to having a
specific policy regarding the assets incorporated into the fund’s
portfolio to achieve higher or lower portfolio coskewness.
In order to thoroughly study the relevance of including the third
co moment of asset returns in performance evaluation, two differ
ent multifactor asset pricing models are considered: the CAPM and
the Carhart (1997) four factor model. In both models, a coskew
ness factor is added and the best adjustment of risk3 is sought.
The use of a coskewness factor is based on the results from the asset
pricing literature, which has demonstrated the convenience of using
coskewness models instead of the popular Fama and French (1993)
three factor model. Thus, Harvey and Siddique (2000) test the
three moment CAPM’s implication that a stock with a negative
coskewness with the market will earn a higher risk premium. They
form a coskewness factor following the methodology that Fama
and French use in constructing the SMB and HML factors and find
that coskewness is economically significant. Barone Adesi et al.
(2004) use a quadratic model and finds that additional variables rep
resenting portfolio characteristics (such as those considered in the
Fama and French model) have no explanatory power for expected re
turns when coskewness is taken into account. Chung et al. (2006)
suggest that higher order co moments are important for risk averse
investors concerned about extreme outcomes. The authors also find
that the risk factors of Fama and French approximate these higher
order co moments especially when using low frequencies. Vanden
(2006) also points out that SMB and HML measure coskewness risk,
but that they are imperfect proxies. More recently, Smith (2007)
finds that while the conditional two moment CAPM and the condi
tional Fama and French three factor model are rejected, a model that
includes coskewness is not rejected by the data.4
This paper yields revealing results. First, it finds that the
coskewness factor is both economically and statistically signifi
cant. Second, the average fund performance will change when
coskewness is taken into account; this change is greater when
compared with the CAPM alpha (the average alpha for all equity
funds is moved to the left side by more than double) than with a
Carhart model (the average alpha is modified by approximately
6%). Third, in general, these movements in the alpha might affect
categories of equity mutual funds in different ways, so that in this
sample, the Aggressive Growth funds are made to look better while
the rest look worse. Fourth, as those variations in performance will
have a different sign depending on the loading on the coskewness
factor, a ranking based on risk adjusted returns without consider
ing coskewness might result in a misleading classification of the
funds. Moreover, one of the most striking results is that many neg
ative (positive) alpha funds measured relative to the CAPM risk
adjustments would be reclassified as positive (negative) alpha
3 An alternative way to take into account the skewness of the return distribution
could be in an equilibrium framework like that of Leland (1999). However, this
performance measure would require two assumptions: the rate of return on the
market portfolio must be independently and identically distributed and perfect
markets must exist. Moreover, many of the econometric problems related to the
estimation of the CAPM alpha will also be present in estimating this performance
measure, including finding an appropriate proxy for the market portfolio (as
mentioned in Leland (1999), footnote 22). In contrast, multifactor pricing models,
such as the ones proposed in this paper, are not subject to those problems.
4 Coskewness is also considered relevant in some other economic areas. For
example, Vines et al. (1994) study the importance of coskewness in the pricing of real
estate and Christie-David and Chaudhry (2001) examine it in explaining the return-
generating process in futures markets. Bali et al. (2008) investigates the role of
conditional skewness in the estimation of conditional VaR. Post et al. (2008) focuses
on the 3MCAPM and the economic meaning of the coskewness premium.
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thends using the CAPM plus coskewness. Fifth, those managers
ing a specific policy for managing coskewness repeat the same
licy over time, thus persistence in coskewness policy appears
the majority of the time periods. Sixth, fund turnover and fund
tegory are related to having a specific policy of managing
skewness.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the follow
g section describes the coskewness measure and the models used
analyze its effect on performance evaluation. Section 3 presents
e database of mutual funds and the benchmarks used. Section 4
ovides the empirical evidence. Summaries and conclusions are
esented in Section 5.
The effect of the coskewness factor on performance
aluation
1. The coskewness
Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) extend the CAPM to incorporate
e effect of skewness in asset pricing, developing the three mo
ent CAPM (3MCAPM). Thus, in equilibrium, the expected returns
a risky asset satisfy:
Rf ¼ k1bi þ k2ci; ð1Þ
here Ri is one plus the expected return of the risky asset, Rf de
tes one plus the return of the risk free asset, bi is the systematic
k, and ci indicates the systematic skewness (standardized
skewness) of the asset, a measure of the asset’s coskewness risk.5
e risk premiums of each risk factor are k1 and k2. Therefore, inves
rs are compensated by the expected excess returns for bearing the
lative risks measured by beta and gamma. Given that the investor
quires higher returns for securities with higher betas, a positive
k premium, k1 > 0, is expected. However, there would be a nega
e risk premium for assets with positive systematic skewness,
< 0.
From an empirical point of view, asset pricing models can be
sted through the restrictions that they impose on the coefficients
the return generating process. Thus, the return generating pro
sses consistent with the CAPM and the 3MCAPM are the market
odel and the quadratic model, respectively. Whereas the market
odel assumes that the return of a risky asset is linearly related to
e return of a stock index representative of the market, the qua
atic model establishes a nonlinear relationship expressed as:
;t f ;t ¼ c0i þ c1i½RM;t Rf ;t  þ c2i½RM;t RM;t2 þ mit: ð2Þ
e estimation of c2i in the quadratic model (2) gives a coskewness
easure. Through the use of a partitioned regression argument
risch Waugh Lovell theorem) it is easy to verify that c2i is equal
Eðei;tþ1e2M;tþ1Þ=Vðe2M;tþ1Þ, where ei;tþ1 represents the residuals from
e regression of the excess return on the contemporaneous market
cess return and eM;tþ1 represents the residuals of the excess mar
t return over its mean.
Harvey and Siddique (2000) compute the standardized uncon
tional coskewness as
¼ Eðei;tþ1e
2
M;tþ1Þ
Eðe2i;tþ1Þ
q
Eðe2M;tþ1Þ
; ð3Þ
According to Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) the expressions are: bi
i Ri ÞðRM RM Þ
½ðRM RM Þ2 
and ci
E½ðRi Ri ÞðRM RM Þ2 
E½ðRM RM Þ3 
, where ci is defined as the ratio of the
skewness of that asset’s return and the market’s return to the market’s skewness.
the same way that the covariance (the numerator of beta) represents the marginal
ntribution of an asset to the variance of the market portfolio, the coskewness (the
merator of gamma) represents the asset’s marginal contribution to the skewness of
market portfolio.
2
3where eM;tþ1 and ei;tþ1 are defined as above. The information given
by the coskewness allows a risk factor to be constructed in the same
way that the Fama and French (1993) factors are constructed. This
risk factor can be replicated by a portfolio of assets. In order to elab
orate on this factor, it is necessary to compute the coskewness mea
sure for each asset and then use it to rank the assets. The assets
form two portfolios: one contains the 30% of the assets that have
the most negative coskewness (S ) and another contains the 30%
of the assets with the most positive coskewness (S+). The return
spread of the two portfolios (S S+) and the return spread of the
portfolio S and the risk free rate (S Rf) are the coskewness risk
factors (CSK).
2.2. The models
In order to analyze the effect of the coskewness factor on per
formance evaluation, the standard CAPM and the Carhart (1997)
four factor model are used as base cases. The Carhart (1997)
four factor model uses the three factors of Fama and French
(1993) plus one that captures the momentum effect. Here, the
four factor model (FF4) is used to adjust the performance of the
fund for the regularities found in financial returns. Thus, the mod
els are
Ri;t Rf ;t ¼ ai þ bmi ½RM;t Rf ;t  þ ei;t; ð4Þ
Ri;t Rf ;t ¼ ai þ bmi ½RM;t Rf ;t  þ bsmbi SMBt þ bhmli HMLt
þ bwmli WMLt þ ei;t ; ð5Þ
where fRM;t Rf ;t ; SMBt;HMLt;WMLtg represents the market, size,
book to market value, and momentum factors.
When a coskewness factor is included,
Ri;t Rf ;t ¼ ai þ bmi ½RM;t Rf ;t  þ bcski CSKt þ ei;t ; ð6Þ
Ri;t Rf ;t ¼ ai þ bmi ½RM;t Rf ;t  þ bsmbi SMBt þ bhmli HMLt
þ bwmli WMLt þ bcski CSKt þ ei;t : ð7Þ
To study the effect of adding this new factor to the traditional Jen
sen’s alpha, the coskewness risk must be considered in the same
way as the systematic market risk. Just as greater returns are re
quired for portfolios (and thus managers) with larger systematic
risks (betas), in a model that includes coskewness, greater returns
are required for portfolios (managers) with larger coskewness risks.
To illustrate, evaluate two mutual funds with an annual abnormal
return of 3% as measured by the classic Jensen’s alpha,
aA aB 0.03. Manager A has over weighted the portfolio with as
sets that have negative coskewness and has therefore obtained a
spread by coskewness, whereas Manager B has not given special
consideration to coskewness. According to (6), the loading parame
ter that captures the coskewness risk must be positive for Manager
A (e.g. bCSK 0.20) and zero for Manager B. Because investors dislike
negative coskewness assets that require greater returns, the
coskewness factor must have a positive mean (e.g. 0.10), so the final
alpha for Manager A will be lower than the alpha for Manager B.
Therefore, the abnormal return obtained would be
aCSK,A aA b2(CSK) 0.03 0.2(0.10) 0.01 for Manager A and
aCSK,B aB b2(CSK) 0.03 for Manager B.
In this example, the manager who tries to profit from the
coskewness spread achieves the worse performance. The reason
is that alpha is a performance measure that considers risk adjusted
returns, so that just as greater returns are required of a manager
assuming larger market risk (and therefore a greater bm, reducing
his Jensen’s alpha), greater returns are required of the manager
assuming a larger systematic risk of skewness. To complete the
argument, it is important to note that Manager A adds negativeskewness to the portfolio by incorporating negative coskewness
assets, which is an undesirable situation for investors. Thus, a cor
rect measure of abnormal returns must penalize this strategy.
2.3. Conditional performance evaluation
The models explained above use unconditional expected re
turns and are based on the assumption that factor loadings are
constant. However, if expected returns and risks vary over time,
such an unconditional approach may give biased results. Chen
and Knez (1996) and Ferson and Schadt (1996) advocate condi
tional performance evaluation (CPE). In their one and multi factor
models, factor loadings (betas) are conditioned on public informa
tion variables. The resulting conditional Jensen’s alphas represent
the average difference between the return of a fund and the return
of the dynamic strategies based on public information.6
Therefore, in this paper, the previous models are analyzed in a
conditional and an unconditional framework, given the existing
evidence that asset pricing models need to be conditional since ex
pected returns vary over time. This analysis contributes to condi
tional performance evaluation literature by presenting the
differences between conditional and unconditional performance
evaluation when coskewness is included.
3. Data and benchmarks
3.1. Fund returns
The database used in this study consists of monthly returns for
6819 US equity mutual funds between January 1962 and December
2006, obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). These mutual funds are classified into three categories:
Aggressive Growth, Growth Income Funds, and Long Term Growth
Funds.
Table 1 provides a complete economic and statistical descrip
tion of the database. Presented in rows for each category are the
annualized mean return, risk (standard deviation), kurtosis, mini
mum and maximum monthly return during the entire sample per
iod, and the percentage of funds for which the null hypothesis of
normality, using a Jarque Bera test, is rejected. The table also
shows the total number of mutual funds in each category in inter
vals of 36 84, 84 120, 120 156, 156 288, more than 288, and
more than 432 observations.
The figures in Table 1 indicate that the kurtosis is, on average,
higher than 3 (a value under the null of a normal distribution)
and the null hypothesis of normality is rejected for approximately
48% of mutual funds (51% of Aggressive Growth, 53% of Growth In
come Funds, and 44% of Long Term Growth Funds). According to
this result, the use of a performance measure based on normality
should be questioned.
3.2. Benchmark portfolios
This study uses the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value weighted
index as the market portfolio. The monthly series of SMB, HML, and
WML factors obtained from Kenneth French’s website7 is used to
capture the effects of size, book to market value, and momentum.
The short term risk free security is the 1 month Treasury bill (from
Ibbotson Associates). The predetermined variables used as instru
ments in the conditional models are: (1) the lagged level of the
6 Christopherson et al. (1998) propose a refinement of the conditional performance
evaluation. Introducing time variation in alpha makes it possible to determine
whether managerial performance is indeed constant or varies over time as a function
of the conditional information.
7 http://www.mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
one month Treasury bill yields; (2) the lagged dividend yield of the the coskewness factor, including ordinary common stocks and
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Table 1
Summary statistics of mutual funds: January 1962–March 2006.
Mean return Standard deviation Kurtosis Max. losses Max. returns Test normality
Aggressive Growth 11.038 21.698 4.272 18.777 17.574 51
Growth/Income 7.610 14.662 4.191 13.416 10.624 53
Long-Term Growth 7.441 17.674 4.215 15.132 13.749 44
All Funds 8.595 18.206 4.272 15.854 14.192 48
Number of funds 36–84 84–120 120–156 156–288 >288 >432
Aggressive Growth 2112 1054 600 244 169 45 18
Growth/Income 1617 751 426 197 167 76 50
Long-Term Growth 3090 1708 715 366 196 105 61
All Funds 6819 3513 1741 807 532 226 129
The table reports summary statistics for 6819 mutual funds in the database categorised by investment objectives: ‘‘Aggressive Growth”, ‘‘Income”, ‘‘Growth and Income” and
‘‘Long-Term Growth”. A fund is included in the investment universe if it contains at least 36 consecutive monthly return observations. For each category, we present in
columns the annualized mean return (as a %), standard deviation (as a %), kurtosis, monthly minimum return (Max. Losses) and monthly maximum return (Max. Return) during
the entire sample period, and the percentage of funds for which the null hypothesis of normality of a Jarque–Bera test is rejected at the 10% level of significance. The table also
shows the total number of mutual funds in each category in intervals of 36–84, 84–120, 120–156, 156–288 and more than 288 and 432 observations.CRSP value weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stock index; (3) a lagged
measure of the slope of the term structure; and (4) a lagged corpo
rate spread on the corporate bond market. The term spread is a con
stant maturity 10 year Treasury bond yield minus the 3 month T
bill yield. The corporate bond default yield spread is Moody’s BAA
rated corporate bond yield minus the AAA rated corporate bond
yield. These variables have figured most prominently in studies of
mutual fund performance (see Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Ferson
and Warther, 1996).
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the risk factors. The
mean, median, and standard deviation return data are in annual
percentages. In addition, the monthly maximum and minimum re
turn, and the p value of the Jarque Bera test are shown. The mar
ket factor is the excess return on the value weighted index; SMB is
the factor mimicking portfolio size; HML is the factor mimicking
portfolio book to market value; WML is the factor mimicking port
folio 1 month return momentum; and (S S+) and (S Rf) are the
coskewness factors.
Monthly US equity returns from CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ
files from December 1957 to December 2006 are used to compute
Table 2
Summary statistics of risk factors and instruments.15
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Market SMB HML WML S –S+ S –Rf
Mean 5.453 6.118 1.973 10.184 3.190 8.755
Median 9.251 6.000 1.560 10.680 2.239 8.608
Maximum 16.049 13.630 13.420 18.400 16.384 23.005
Minimum 23.134 9.840 21.850 25.050 13.422 19.070
Std. dev. 15.370 9.975 11.113 13.825 10.033 16.721
Skewness 0.480 0.274 0.595 0.650 0.481 0.007
Kurtosis 4.933 5.380 8.675 8.470 6.747 4.763
Jarque–Bera 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross correlations
Market SBM HML WML S –S+ S –Rf
EXRM 1.000
SBM 0.402 1.000
HML 0.290 0.271 1.000
WML 0.079 0.041 0.103 1.000
S –S+ 0.005 0.109 0.126 0.055 1.000
S –Rf+ 0.913 0.310 0.277 0.132 0.371 1.000
This table reports summary statistics on the risk factors. The mean, median and std.
dev. are represented in annual percentages. We show the monthly maximum and
minimum return, and the p-value of the Jarque–Bera test. The Market factor is the
excess return on the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq portfolio; SMB is
the factor mimicking portfolio for size; HML is the factor mimicking portfolio for
book-to-market, WML is the factor mimicking portfolio for the 1-month return
momentum; S –S+ and S –Rf are the coskewness factors. Table 2 also presents the
contemporaneous correlations between the factors included in the models.
8
whcluding real estate investment trusts, stocks of companies incor
rated outside of the United States, and closed end funds. For
bustness, various specifications of the coskewness factor are
vestigated to ensure that it is not sensitive to its construction
ethodology.8 Thus, there are various cut off definitions (bottom
% top 15% and bottom 20% top 20%) in addition to Harvey and
ddique’s (2000) factor (bottom 30% top 30%). Moreover, these fac
rs are computed by employing the parameter c2 from the quadratic
odel (2) to sort the common stocks instead of using the standard
d unconditional coskewness (3) proposed by Harvey and Siddique
000).
The risk premium for all these coskewness factors is positive,
coming higher as the cut off is more extreme. The risk premiums
r the (S S+) are 3.44%, 3.19%, and 2.33% annually for the 15 15,
20, and 30 30 cut offs respectively, and range from 8.9% to
30% annually in the case of the (S Rf) coskewness factor. Con
ructing the coskewness factor from the quadratic model, the pre
iums for the different cut offs are 3.52%, 2.74%, and 2.56%
spectively for the (S S+), and 9.94%, 9.01%, and 8.73% for the
Rf) factor.
In order to analyze the potential impact of the factors when
ey were added to the models, the correlation coefficient among
l of them is computed. The correlation for the same coskewness
ctor using different cut offs is very high (e.g. for the (S S+)
15 and 20 20 the correlation is 0.94), allowing the conclusion
at the factor is not sensitive to the selection of different cut offs.
addition, the correlation computed using different measures of
skewness is also high, e.g. for the (S S+) 30 30 from the Harvey
d Siddique measure (2000) and the measure from the quadratic
odel it is 0.85. Therefore, the coskewness factor is not sensitive to
e different ways of measuring the coskewness.
Table 2 also presents the contemporaneous correlations be
een the factors included in the models. Observe that these cor
lations are generally small, ranging from 0.40 to 0.37. But
ere is one case in which correlation is not negligible: when the
isting correlation between the market factor and the coskewness
ctor (S Rf) is 0.913. In order to avoid possible multicollinearity
oblems, this coskewness factor is orthogonalized with respect
the market factor. The correlation with the market then changes
zero, and the correlation with the other coskewness factor (S
) changes to 0.90 (whereas before it was only 0.37), corroborat
g the robustness of the coskewness factor used here. Conse
ently, the rest of the paper shows results only considering the
The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for comments on this section,
ich have led to substantial improvements in the paper.
4
factor (S S+), where coskewness is computed using (3) and with
9
average and the Growth Income and Long Term Growth funds pres
Table 3
Skewness and coskewness of mutual funds.
All funds Aggressive Growth Growth/Income Long-Term Growth
Panel A: unconditional skewness
Mean 0.355 0.299 0.455 0.340
Median 0.399 0.327 0.470 0.391
Positive and Sign. at 5% 4.458 7.955 1.546 3.592
Negative and Sign. at 5% 49.890 42.330 61.534 48.964
Panel B: unconditional coskewness
Mean 0.013 0.063 0.016 0.006
Median 0.006 0.065 0.029 0.014
Positive and Sign. at 5% 7.626 4.545 8.534 9.256
Negative and Sign. at 5% 12.011 16.241 9.895 10.227
Panel C: C2i
Mean 0.134 0.531 0.093 0.018
Median 0.018 0.543 0.127 0.083
Positive and Sign. at 5% 4.355 1.847 5.937 5.243
Negative and Sign. at 5% 5.954 8.665 5.318 4.434
t-Statistic 0.826 0.841 0.857 0.800
The unconditional skewness is computed as the third central moment over the mean. The unconditional coskewness is defined as Eðei;tþ1e2M;tþ1Þ= Eðe2i;tþ1Þ
q
Eðe2M;tþ1Þ, where
ei,t+1 is the residual from the regression of the excess return on the contemporaneous market excess return and eM,t+1 is the residual of the excess market return over its mean.
c2i is an alternative measure of coskewness from the quadratic model consistent with the three-moment CAPM, Ri;t  Rf ;t c0i þ c1i½RM;t  Rf ;t  þ c2i½RM;t  RM;t 2 þ mit .
Significance levels for unconditional skewness and coskewness are computed based on bootstrap percentiles methodology (for a more detailed description on this meth-
odology see Efron and Tibshirani (1993)), and we find that at 5% they are 0.40 and 0.40 for the unconditional skewness and 0.20 and 0.20 for the unconditional coskewness.the intermediate cut off 20 20.
4. Empirical results
4.1. The coskewness of mutual funds
Table 3 reports some summary statistics that compare the
coskewness measures across the three categories of funds analyzed
in this paper. Panel A shows the unconditional skewness computed
as the third central moment over the mean. The results indicate
that, considering all funds jointly, half of the funds have a negative
skewness, significant at the 5% level.10 For each of the categories,
these percentages are 42%, 61%, and 49%, respectively. This result
shows that the skewness of the funds is significant and that the third
moment of the return distribution should not be ignored. Panel B
presents the results of measuring the unconditional coskewness of
the mutual funds. The mean value for all equity mutual funds is neg
ative ( 0.013) and the proportion of funds that have a significant
coskewness is, on average, 19.63%. Moreover, it can be observed that
each category has a different standardized unconditional coskew
ness, with the Aggressive Growth being the only one having a nega
tive average coskewness ( 0.063) and further, having the greatest
number of funds with negative unconditional coskewness (16%). Gi
ven that a mutual fund is a portfolio of assets, this finding indicates
that approximately 16% of those mutual funds are investing in assets
with negative coskewness and that therefore the required return of
these funds according to the 3MCAPM should be higher. When the
quadratic model (2) is estimated as an alternative measure of
coskewness, the results are similar to those found in Panel B. The
mean value estimated for the parameter c2, shown in Panel C, is neg
ative when all categories are considered together and the percentage
of funds with a significant parameter is around 10%. Again, the
Aggressive Growth category shows a negative value ( 0.531) on
9 The results for the rest of the specifications of the coskewness factor are very
similar and are available upon request.
10 Significance levels for unconditional skewness and coskewness are computed
based on bootstrap percentiles methodology (for a more detailed description of this
methodology see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Here, they are 0.40 and 0.40 for the
unconditional skewness and 0.20 and 0.20 for the unconditional coskewness at the
5% level.ent a positive one.
The figures in Table 3 might give the impression that very few
funds exhibit significant coskewness and that, as a result, the im
pact of coskewness could be marginal. Given that the main goal
of the paper is to analyze the importance of coskewness as an addi
tional factor in performance evaluation, it is interesting to report
the funds’ exposure to the coskewness factor rather than just the
coskewness measures. The sensitivities to the coskewness factor
depend on the factor and the funds. Since, in general, the average
betas differ significantly from zero for all categories and factors,
using this (S S+) factor, between 58% and 64% of the funds are sta
tistically significant.11
Hence, these results suggest that coskewness could play an
important role in explaining the performance evaluation of mutual
funds and that disregarding it will create a bias perhaps a signif
icant one in assessing performance evaluation. This hypothesis is
tested in the following section.
4.2. Performance evaluation of mutual funds
The results of the time series estimation for the models are re
ported in Table 4 (the first panel reporting all funds jointly and
subsequent panels reporting each category of mutual funds). For
each panel, Rows 1 and 2 show the unconditional estimation of
the CAPM and the CAPM plus the coskewness factor. The Carhart
four factor model (1997) and the same model plus the coskewness
factor are in Rows 3 and 4. For each model, alpha, beta(s), the ad
justed R2 of the regressions, and the likelihood ratio test are
reported.
An interesting result from Table 4 is that, in general, for all the
categories of funds used in this paper and for all models, the aver
age coefficient obtained for the CSK factor is statistically different
from zero. The values range from 0.09 to 0.10, depending on
the category and the model analyzed. In addition to statistical sig
nificance, there is the economic significance. As the coskewness
factor is an excess return, an approximate value of the coskewness
risk premium can be calculated by multiplying the loadings on the
factor by the sample average return of the coskewness portfolio
11 These figures are calculated by regressing the excess return of each fund on the
returns on the (S -S+) portfolio.
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(3.19%). Thus, the average coskewness risk premium ranges from
0.29% to 0.32%.
In Panel A of Table 4, where all funds are analyzed jointly, there
2
coskewness on the performance of a fund is not negligible. For
example, from Table 4, when comparing the mean alpha from
the CAPM and that from the CAPM + CSK, alpha decreases by
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Table 4
Measures of performance using models with and without coskewness.
Alpha Rm SMB HML WML CSK R
2
ADJ (%) LR-test
Panel A: All Funds
CAPM 0.017 0.997 76
(1.28) (21.47)
CAPM + CSK 0.041 1.004 0.043 78 0.023
(1.23) (21.42) (2.54)
FF4 0.140 1.015 0.144 0.077 0.036 84
(1.14) (21.64) (3.70) (3.64) (3.16)
FF4 + CSK 0.132 1.011 0.144 0.078 0.031 0.004 85 0.104
(1.15) (21.90) (3.64) (3.28) (3.05) (1.89)
Panel B: Aggressive Growth
CAPM 0.145 1.101 66
(1.20) (14.54)
CAPM + CSK 0.133 1.096 0.033 69 0.020
(1.12) (14.42) (2.37)
FF4 0.174 1.118 0.406 0.134 0.131 80
(1.14) (16.14) (5.75) (4.00) (3.10)
FF4 + CSK 0.143 1.100 0.427 0.176 0.117 0.090 81 0.097
(1.12) (16.09) (5.72) (3.83) (2.95) (1.78)
Panel C: Growth Income
CAPM 0.071 0.855 82
(1.23) (28.81)
CAPM + CSK 0.132 0.884 0.099 85 0.015
(1.27) (29.21) (2.94)
FF4 0.102 0.891 0.020 0.129 0.069 88
(1.13) (29.47) (2.85) (3.54) (3.71)
FF4 + CSK 0.117 0.900 0.038 0.093 0.066 0.074 89 0.034
(1.19) (30.28) (2.92) (3.04) (3.64) (2.34)
Panel D: Long-Term Growth
CAPM 0.099 1.000 79
(1.36) (22.36)
CAPM + CSK 0.111 1.004 0.021 81 0.033
(1.29) (22.12) (2.44)
FF4 0.136 1.008 0.051 0.011 0.027 86
(1.14) (21.29) (2.73) (3.45) (2.92)
FF4 + CSK 0.132 1.007 0.046 0.002 0.023 0.014 86 0.148
(1.16) (21.49) (2.60) (3.02) (2.81) (1.72)
This table shows the OLS estimates of the models (4)–(7) for equity mutual funds. Alpha is in monthly units and in percentages. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.
LR test is the median right-tail probability value of a standard likelihood ratio test in order to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the
explanatory power of the model with or without the coskewness factor.is a slight increase in the R value when a coskewness factor is used
as an additional explanatory variable; this increase being from 0.76
to 0.78 when the coskewness factor is incorporated in the uncon
ditional CAPM, and from 0.84 to 0.85 when it is included in the
unconditional FF4 model.
The last column in Table 4 reports a standard likelihood ratio
(LR) test in order to determine whether there is a statistically sig
nificant difference between the explanatory power of the new
model with coskewness and the previous model. The introduction
of this extra factor leads to an increase in log likelihood, indicating
the relevance of the coskewness. The explanatory power of the
coskewness model increases significantly over each corresponding
model without this new factor, especially relevant in the case of
the Aggressive Growth and Growth Income funds for every model,
and in the Long Term Growth category only for the CAPM. There
fore, not incorporating the effect of the systematic skewness may
create a potential problem of specification that biases the risk ad
justed return obtained by mutual funds.
Table 4 also reports the average alphas and their t statistic. In
general they are close to zero and negative except for the estima
tion of the CAPM for the Aggressive Growth category where the al
phas are positive. Although the average alphas are not statistically
significant in any case, the economic significance of the effect of.024 percent per month, from 0.017 to 0.041, after coskew
ss is controlled. Thus, the net effect of coskewness on alpha is
proximately 0.28% (0.024  12) annually.
However, it must be noted that the average change in perfor
ance, measured by alpha, is not uniform across categories and
odels. First, when coskewness is included in the CAPM, the
ange in alpha is always greater than when it is included in the
4 model. Second, when comparing performance among different
tegories, accounting for the coskewness generally makes the
nds belonging to the Growth Income and Long Term Growth cat
ories look worse, but the funds in the Aggressive Growth cate
ry look better. Furthermore, it is important to note that
oking only at average alphas may erroneously lead to the conclu
n that the economic impact of coskewness on performance is
gligible. This is because within a fund sample, there may be
anagers with a positive beta for the coskewness factor (which
ould imply a decrease in alpha, as these funds have greater expo
re to assets with negative coskewness which is undesirable for
e investor) and managers with a negative beta for the coskew
ss factor (which would imply an increase in alpha). Therefore,
skewness may have a negligible impact on the average alpha,
en if its effect on individual alphas is significant. This argument
ggests that a more detailed analysis is needed to assess the im
6
pact of coskewness on performance. In particular, the analysis
should pay special attention to the coskewness management strat
the negative and significant alphas increase from 21% to 23%, in the
Aggressive Growth category they decrease from 20% to 17%.
Table 5
Measures of performance using conditional models with and without coskewness.
Alpha CSK R2ADJ (%) LR-test Pval F Alpha CSK R
2
ADJ (%) LR-test Pval F
Panel A: All Funds Panel B: Aggressive Growth
CAPM 0.012 78 0.10 0.178 68 0.18
(1.21) (1.06)
CAPM + CSK 0.034 0.040 80 0.04 0.16 0.149 0.042 70 0.040 0.26
(1.20) (2.24) (1.01) (2.10)
FF4 0.117 85 0.17 0.114 81 0.22
(1.10) (1.03)
FF4 + CSK 0.113 0.009 86 0.103 0.18 0.093 0.094 82 0.104 0.24
(1.14) (1.81) (1.05) (1.69)
Panel C: Growth Income Panel D: Long Term Growth
CAPM 0.122 84 0.05 0.084 81 0.10
(1.26) (1.28)
CAPM + CSK 0.157 0.081 86 0.026 0.08 0.095 0.017 83 0.049 0.14
(1.33) (2.57) 0.10 (1.25) (2.16)
FF4 0.128 89 0.09 0.114 87 0.16
(1.19) (1.10)
FF4 + CSK 0.138 0.069 90 0.034 0.09 0.113 0.007 87 0.143 0.17
(1.27) (2.25) (1.13) (1.66)
This table shows the OLS estimates of the conditional models (4)–(7) for all funds analyzed in this paper. We use the lagged level of the 1-month Treasury bill yield, the lagged
dividend yield of the CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stock index, a lagged measure of the slope of the term structure and a lagged corporate spread on the
corporate bond market as instruments. Alpha is in monthly units and in percentages and CSK is the coskewness loading factor. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.
LR test is the median right-tail probability value of a standard likelihood ratio test in order to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the
explanatory power of the model with or without the coskewness factor. Pval F is the median right-tail probability value of the F-test for the marginal significance of the term
including the instruments.
Table 6
Distribution of t-statistics for the alpha coefficients.
CAPM CAPM + CSK
ALL AG GI LTG ALL AG GI LTG
Panel A
Bonferroni p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
t < 2.291 10 3 12 15 10 3 13 14
2.291 < t < 1.995 4 1 4 5 5 2 6 5
1.995 < t < 1.666 5 2 5 6 5 2 8 6
1.666 < t < 0 37 32 43 38 40 31 49 42
0 < t < 1.666 33 40 30 28 32 46 21 27
1.666 < t < 1.995 3 6 2 2 3 6 1 2
1.995 < t < 2.291 3 5 2 2 2 5 1 1
t > 2.291 6 11 2 4 3 6 1 3
Bonferroni p-value 0 0 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 0.19
FF4 FF4 + CSK
ALL AG GI LTG ALL AG GI LTG
Panel B
Bonferroni p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
t < 2.291 10 9 10 11 10 8 11 10
2.291 < t < 1.995 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 6
1.995 < t < 1.666 7 7 6 7 6 5 7 7
1.666 < t < 0 50 50 52 49 49 49 52 49
0 < t < 1.666 26 27 26 25 25 29 22 24
1.666 < t < 1.995 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
1.995 < t < 2.291 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
t > 2.291 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
Bonferroni p-value 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.51 1
The numbers in each column of the table are the percentages of mutual funds for
which the t-statistics for the alphas fell within the range of values indicated in the
far-left-hand column. In Panel A we show the models using the CAPM as a base
case. In Panel B the base case is the FF4 model. Inside each type of model, in
columns, we present each of the categories of funds: ALL (All Funds), AG (Aggressive
Growth Funds), GI (Growth Income Funds) and LTG (Long-Term Growth Funds). The
Bonferroni p-value indicates the p-values based on the Bonferroni inequality. This is
computed as the p-value (one-tailed) associated with the maximum or minimum t-
statistic, multiplied by the number of funds. It tests the hypothesis that all the
alphas are zero against the alternative that at least one is positive (maximum value)
or negative (minimum value).
7egy implemented by fund managers. In the following subsection,
the funds will be grouped according to their sensitivity to the
coskewness factor.
The estimation of the conditional models presented in Table 5
shows that the signs for the loadings on the coskewness factor
are the same as in the unconditional estimations, and also that
they are statistically significant. According to the LR test, in general
there is a statistically significant increment in the explanatory
power of the model with coskewness, clearer in the CAPM models
than in the FF4 models, and clearer for the Growth Income cate
gory. An F test is performed for the marginal explanatory power
of conditioning information in the models. In this sample, the F
test shows that, considered together, the instruments are not sig
nificant at the 5% level.12 Therefore, given that the conditional mod
els seem not to contribute significantly, the rest of the paper focuses
on the unconditional models.
Table 6 displays the distribution of the t statistics for alpha
coefficients to analyze whether the coskewness factor significantly
changes the distribution of alphas. The figures in each column of
the body of the table are the percentages of mutual funds in which
the t statistics for the alphas fall within the range of values indi
cated in the far left hand column. Panel A of Table 6 reports the
unconditional models using the CAPM as a base case and Panel B
the unconditional FF4 model. In general, when systematic skew
ness is considered, the distribution of the alphas moves slightly
to the left, indicating that the coskewness factor makes the average
performance of fund managers look worse.
If the coskewness factor is added to the unconditional CAPM,
the percentage of negative and significant alphas increases by be
tween 1% and 6%, depending on the category of funds. The larger
increases from 21% to 27% are obtained in the Growth Income
funds. In the case of adding the coskewness factor to the FF4 model
the results depend a lot on the category. While in Growth Income
12 Ferson and Schadt (1996) find p-values of 0.06 for this test in a different sample,
from 1968 to 1990.
4.3. The effect of coskewness and the coskewness policy performance of funds managing coskewness while not affecting
those not managing coskewness.
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Table 7
The significance of coskewness in performance.
bCSK CAPM (a%) CAMP + CSK (a%) bCSK) FF4 (a%) FF4 + CSK (a%)
All Funds
Q1 0.30 0.14 0.04** 0.27 0.15 0.08**
Q2 0.09 0.14 0.09** 0.09 0.16 0.14
Q3 0.07 0.08 0.12** 0.02 0.13 0.13
Q4 0.19 0.07 0.04** 0.12 0.16 0.16
Q5 0.35 0.21 0.00** 0.20 0.11 0.14**
Aggressive Growth
Q1 0.44 0.04 0.22** 0.37 0.14 0.06**
Q2 0.17 0.04 0.14** 0.23 0.16 0.11*
Q3 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.15
Q4 0.27 0.17 0.05** 0.04 0.16 0.16
Q5 0.44 0.50 0.23** 0.21 0.24 0.24
Growth Income
Q1 0.13 0.19 0.13** 0.08 0.15 0.14
Q2 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.13
Q3 0.09 0.11 0.16** 0.09 0.09 0.11
Q4 0.20 0.04 0.08** 0.13 0.06 0.09*
Q5 0.32 0.07 0.12** 0.22 0.07 0.12**
Long-Term Growth
Q1 0.27 0.22 0.07** 0.20 0.14 0.09**
Q2 0.11 0.21 0.14** 0.07 0.15 0.14
Q3 0.03 0.18 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.12
Q4 0.14 0.04 0.12** 0.11 0.15 0.16
Q5 0.31 0.15 0.03** 0.21 0.12 0.15**
This table presents the average estimated alphas in the different models once funds have been classified into quintiles based on the t-statistic of the beta coefficient of the
coskewness factor (S –S+). The bCSK column presents the value of the beta coefficient of the coskewness factor in each quintile. CAPM (a%) indicates the average alpha using
the CAPM in each quintile. CAMP + CSK (a%) is the average alpha as a using the CAPM with an additional coskewness factor, FF4 (a%) is the average alpha form the Carhart
model, and FF4 + CSK (a%) is the average alpha form a Carhart model including the coskewness factor.
* Means significance at the 10% level for the Wilcoxon test of differences in alpha distribution between the model with and without coskewness.
** Means significance at the 5% level for the Wilcoxon test of differences in alpha distribution between the model with and without coskewness.
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higAs stated in the previous section, the net effect of considering
coskewness and mutual fund performance cannot be analyzed only
by the changes in the average alpha, given that different mutual
funds have different exposure to the coskewness factor. Funds with
negative sensitivity to the coskewness factor add assets with posi
tive coskewness to their portfolios and therefore investors will de
mand lower returns for these funds. The average alpha (adjusted
by the risk of coskewness) should then be higher. However, those
funds that incorporate negative coskewness assets must present
a positive beta of coskewness and investors will demand higher re
turns due to the higher risk of coskewness; in that case, the ad
justed alpha should be lower. Given this, the net effect over the
average alpha may seem small because the effects of both types
of funds are mutually balanced. It could be erroneously concluded
that coskewness has a negligible effect on mutual fund perfor
mance when in fact, as Table 6 shows, this is not the case.
Table 7 shows the average estimated alpha in the different
models once the funds have been classified into quintiles according
to the significance of the beta to the coskewness factor. This table
shows that there are clearly opposite effects on a mutual fund’s al
pha depending on the sign of the loading factor of coskewness. For
example, considering all funds jointly in the first quintile (that is,
the 20% of the funds with the lowest exposure to the CSK factor),
the alpha changes from a negative value of 0.14 to a positive va
lue of 0.04; this variation in means is statistically significant at the
5% level. For the FF4 model the change in alpha is also significant
using all the funds jointly. Similarly, for the 20% of funds with
the greatest sensitivity to the CSK factor (Q5), the effect on alpha
is the opposite, moving from a positive value of 0.21 to a value
of 0.00, and the variation in means is also statistically significant.
Logically, these changes are not statistically significant for the cen
tral quintiles formed by funds that do not manage coskewness.
Therefore, using the coskewness factor allows correcting for theA second outcome observed in Table 7 is that a ranking based on
k adjusted returns without considering coskewness might result
a contrary classification for the funds in the extreme quintiles,
here losers would be considered winners and vice versa. For
ample, in the CAPM the mean alphas for quintiles 1 and 5 are
.14% and 0.21% respectively, but when the coskewness factor
considered the mean alphas change to 0.04% and 0.00%, respec
ely. Moreover, the Wilcoxon test shows how the average alphas
e significantly different in these extreme quintiles.
Analyzing categories, the conclusions are identical. However,
e different effect obtained in the Aggressive Growth and Growth
come funds must be emphasized. Taking into account the
skewness for the former in a FF4 model, the change in alphas
only statistically significant in the first and second quintiles,
dicating a better performance for this category of funds. How
er, in the case of the Growth Income category, the change in
ean alphas is only statistically significant in the last two quintiles
4 and Q5), generating a worse performance for this category. It
ust be noted that this result is in accordance with the movement
alphas observed for the FF4 model in Table 6.
In conclusion, there is evidence of significant changes in mutual
nd performance when the systematic skewness is considered; it
a different sign depending on the fund’s exposure to the coskew
ss factor. Moreover, these changes in performance are statisti
lly significant in 80% of the mutual funds sampled (Q1, Q2, Q4,
d Q5) when the coskewness is introduced in the CAPM, and
e statistically significant for between 20% and 40% in the FF4
odel.13 Once more, these conclusions are consistent independent
the coskewness factor employed here. Consequently, these results
The lower impact of coskewness in the FF4 model indicates that, as Chung et al.
06) and Vanden (2006) pointed out, Fama and French risk factors may be proxying
her order co-moments.
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might have serious effects on other mutual fund research where per
formance ranking is required, such as persistence studies or studies
of investors’ selection ability and flows of mutual funds.
4.4. Persistence managing coskewness
Thus far, the analysis of coskewness has used a 44 year sample.
In such a long period, it is quite likely that the coskewness of the
funds has varied over time.14 Instead of assuming that the coskew
ness betas have remained constant over the whole period, it would
be interesting to estimate them over shorter periods to appreciate,
by categories, whether the coskewness beta changes in magnitude
and sign between periods. In this section, the models presented in
Table 4 are estimated again, splitting the sample into three subsam
ples: 1962 1976, 1977 1991, and 1992 2006. Table 8 reports these
estimations. The alpha with and without coskewness and the beta of
the CSK factor are presented for each model to analyze the sign and
significance of this parameter in each subsample.
The results show that the coskewness policy does not seem con
stant, given that the beta for the CSK factor has varied over time.
Thus, for example, from subperiod 1 to 2, every category changes
from a negative and significant beta to a positive one (e.g. Aggres
sive Growth goes from 0.182 to 0.175) when the CAPM is consid
ered. When the FF4 model is considered, there is also a change in
sign from subperiod 1 to 2 for the majority of categories. From sub
period 2 to 3, there is only a change in sign of the coskewness beta
for the Aggressive Growth and Growth Income categories when the
FF4 model is used.
Hence, these results highlight the need to consider coskewness
when evaluating the performance of mutual funds because,
depending on the time period, coskewness affects them in different
ways.15 In addition, Table 8 shows that the coskewness factor is
especially significant in the third time period for all models and
categories.16
On the other hand, after the previous analysis, it is unknown if
the coskewness policy of a particular manager remains constant
over time, because the funds have been aggregated in categories.
However, Table 7 shows that within the same category there are
funds with positive sensitivity and funds with negative sensitivity
to the coskewness factor. Therefore, from an economic point of
view it would be interesting to find out if certain managers might
be keeping a constant coskewness policy over time and whether
they may be profiting from the spread of coskewness.
A non parametric methodology based upon contingency tables
is used to study this question: a contingency table of funds called
‘‘positives” and ‘‘negatives,” where a fund is termed positive if its
sensitivity to the coskewness factor is positive, and negative if it
is not. The analysis is similar to persistence performance studies.
However, in this context, persistence indicates those funds that
are positive in two consecutive periods, denoted by PP, or negative
in two consecutive periods, denoted by NN. Similarly, positive
(negative) in the first period and negative (positive) in the second
period, denoted by PN (NP), indicates a reversal behavior. This con
tingency analysis requires division of the sample into subperiods,
as well as funds that exist in two consecutive periods. Here, there
are subperiods of 3 years, although in a context of two periods.
Thus, period 62/64 65/67 indicates that the beta of the factor
14 Smith (2007) finds evidence that coskewness is time-varying and rejects the null
hypothesis of constant coskewness.
15 The analysis has also been repeated for only two subsamples (1962–1980 and
1981–2006) and the results are very similar; they are available upon request.
16 In the second subsample (January 1977–December 1991) the absolute t-statistics
for the coskewness beta are not statistically significant on average, but this is because
of the extreme return on the crack of October 1987. If the models are estimated
without this date, then all the t-statistics for beta coskewness are statistically
significant, as in the third subsample.coskewness is considered for period 62/64 and is compared with
that obtained in the 65/67 period.17
A Cross Product Ratio (CPR) is used to detect persistence in
managing coskewness.18 The CPR reports the odds ratio of the num
ber of managers that repeat to the number of those that do not re
peat, that is, (PP  NN/PN  NP). The null hypothesis that the
coskewness policy in the first period is unrelated to the coskewness
policy in the second corresponds to an odds ratio of one. Table 9 re
ports the test statistic for the odds ratio test.19 In Panel A the analysis
is carried out using all mutual funds in the database, and in Panel B
only those funds that really manage the coskewness are considered
(funds with a statistically significant beta of coskewness).
Independent of the coskewness factor used in Panel A, in gen
eral there are some cases in which there is a persistence in manag
ing coskewness (this number is higher when the CAPM is used) but
also a similar number of cases for reversals (e.g. using the CAPM,
the proportion of cases of persistence against reversals is 14/1,
and using the FF4 model, it decreases to 7/7). Thus, it could be erro
neously concluded that there is not a persistence behavior from
mutual fund managers in managing coskewness. As mentioned
above, reversals appear when managers change their coskewness
policy. However, these reversals could also be generated uninten
tionally, that is, when non significant betas are changing from po
sitive to negative or vice versa, but are not statistically significant.
This would be the case of fund managers who have no specific
coskewness policy. In order to verify this issue, those funds with
a significant beta of coskewness are analyzed exclusively.
Panel B presents the results for those mutual funds with a
coskewness beta statistically significant at 5%. Once the funds that
truly take a policy of coskewness are studied separately, in practi
cally all cases independence is rejected and the reversal pattern
disappears. Therefore, the results indicate that fund managers with
a certain policy of managing coskewness tend to maintain it over
time and that this persistence seems to be more relevant in the la
ter time periods (it could also be due to the very low number of
funds at the beginning of the sample). Moreover, that persistence
behavior is sensitive to the model used, being clearer when intro
ducing the coskewness factor in a CAPM.
4.5. Mutual fund characteristics and coskewness
These results suggest that some fund managers are managing
the coskewness of their portfolios. The next logical objective would
be to investigate the characteristics of those funds. Are they the
largest or the smallest funds? Do they have a higher or lower ex
pense ratio? Do they have a higher or lower turnover ratio? To
shed some light on these questions, two different analyses are per
formed: a univariate analysis of the mean of some characteristics
after separating the funds into three different groups according
to their coskewness, and then a multinominal logit model to esti
mate the probability of a fund having a significant coskewness con
ditional on the explanatory variables.
Now, group (S ) includes the 15% of funds with the most nega
tive unconditional coskewness, (S+) the 15% with the most positive
coskewness, and (S0) the rest of the funds. Given the results of Ta
ble 3, this result is similar to separating the funds with significant
coskewness (especially negative coskewness) from the funds with
out significant coskewness. The characteristics considered are To
17 In addition to subperiods of 3 years, the analysis has also been repeated with
subperiods of 5 years and the results and conclusions are identical.
18 There is also a v2 test comparing the observed frequency distribution of PP, PN,
NP, and NN for each fund with the expected frequency distribution. Given that the
conclusions are identical, they not shown to save space, but are available upon
request.
19 The statistical significance of the CPR is determined by using the standard error of
the natural logarithm of the CPR (see Christensen (1990) for more details).
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Table 9
Non-parametric tests of persistence in coskewness policy.
CAPM FF4
Aggressive Growth Growth Income Long-Term Growth Aggressive Growth Growth Income Long-Term Growth
Panel A: analysis with all mutual funds in the database
62/64–65/67 0.23 1.05 0.81 0.49 0.70 0.35
65/67–68/70 0.41 1.18 0.00 1.65* 0.92 2.16*
68/70–71/73 0.36 0.31 0.22 0.92 0.24 0.54
71/73–74/76 0.15 0.62 0.51 0.93 0.05 0.46
74/76–77/79 0.12 1.67* 0.82 1.24 0.91 0.23
77/79–80/82 0.60 1.10 0.37 0.52 1.46* 1.15
80/82–83/85 0.47 2.17** 3.62** 0.65 2.42** 1.35*
83/85–86/88 0.20 1.95** 1.22 2.35 1.66* 0.08
86/88–89/91 0.75 0.46 0.95 0.67 0.47 1.36*
89/91–92/94 4.47** 5.32** 4.47** 0.98 0.90 1.60*
92/94–95/97 0.13 2.82** 3.64** 2.56** 3.58** 3.10**
95/97–98/00 1.49 0.63 1.83** 1.60* 1.00 2.21**
98/00–01/03 2.22** 0.48 7.50** 1.06 3.68** 3.71**
01/03–04/06 8.87** 7.45** 10.66** 3.85** 0.08 0.27
Panel B: analysis with only those mutual funds with a significant beta of coskewness
62/64–65/67 0.47 2.00** 0.33 0.00 1.24 1.01
65/67–68/70 0.47 1.99** 1.06 1.55* 2.28** 2.00*
68/70–71/73 0.24 2.21** 1.30 0.42 0.94 0.30
71/73–74/76 0.31 1.43* 1.55* 0.85 0.68 0.79
74/76–77/79 0.26 0.81 1.56* 0.74 0.76 1.59*
77/79–80/82 0.53 1.76** 3.12** 0.19 1.06 0.39
80/82–83/85 1.55* 3.46** 4.27** 0.37 3.07** 2.03**
83/85–86/88 2.20** 2.72** 2.81** 0.86 1.38* 2.48**
86/88–89/91 1.15 3.84** 1.66* 1.29 1.13 3.06**
89/91–92/94 3.43** 5.85** 6.19** 1.24 2.96** 3.61**
92/94–95/97 2.08** 5.75** 7.10** 3.70** 4.07** 4.37**
95/97–98/00 1.73** 2.03** 1.64* 0.90 1.37 3.13*
98/00–01/03 3.91** 4.41** 12.75** 0.87 0.55 1.73**
01/03–04/06 10.82** 8.57** 14.89** 3.24** 3.58** 5.91**
This table reports the cross-product ratio (CPR), a non-parametric test based upon contingency tables which are computed as indicated in Section 4.4. In Panel A the analysis
is carried out using all mutual funds in the database, and in Panel B only funds that really manage the coskewness are considered (funds with a statistically significant beta of
coskewness at 5%). Bold numbers indicate the cases where persistence in coskewness policy is accepted at 5% or 10%, and underlined numbers denote a statistically significant
reversal in coskewness policy at 5% or 10%.
* Indicates statistical significant at 5%.
** Shows statistical significant at 10%.
Table 8
The coskewness beta by subperiods.
Panel A: 1962–1976 Panel B: 1977–1991 Panel C: 1992–2006
(a%) bCSK (a%) bCSK (a%) bCSK
All Funds
CAPM 0.063 0.013 0.022
CAPM + CSK 0.074 0.089** 0.009 0.079 0.046 0.043**
FF4 0.067 0.056 0.152
FF4 + CSK 0.081 0.085** 0.054 0.011 0.144 0.005**
Aggressive Growth
CAPM 0.070 0.016 0.146
CAPM + CSK 0.048 0.182** 0.007 0.175* 0.136 0.030**
FF4 0.007 0.129 0.192
FF4 + CSK 0.020 0.159** 0.125 0.017 0.159 0.097**
Growth Income
CAPM 0.046 0.028 0.073
CAPM + CSK 0.052 0.072** 0.022 0.007 0.140 0.106**
FF4 0.007 0.021 0.108
FF4 + CSK 0.005 0.067** 0.019 0.003 0.124 0.079**
Long-Term Growth
CAPM 0.129 0.044 0.108
CAPM + CSK 0.139 0.062* 0.035 0.067 0.121 0.020**
FF4 0.148 0.064 0.149
FF4 + CSK 0.158 0.068** 0.060 0.018 0.144 0.013*
This table presents the average estimated alphas (in percentage and monthly units) and the coskewness loading factors for the models indicated in the far-left-column and for
three subsamples (Panel A: 1962–1976; Panel B: 1977–1991; and Panel C: 1992–2006).
* Means significance at the 10% level.
** Means significance at the 5% level.
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tal Net Assets (TNA), Expenses, and Turnover, obtained from the
CRSP database.
The variable TNA is the closing market value of securities
owned, plus all assets minus all liabilities. TNAs from CRSP are re
expenses. Given the differences over time of some characteristics,
such as fund size, the sample is split into three periods: from
1962 to 1976, from 1977 to 1991, and from 1992 to 2006.
Results from the univariate analysis are presented in Table 10.
Table 10
Means of the mutual fund characteristics grouped by coskewness.
Variables S S0 S+ Equally test
TNA 1962–1976 7.376 7.457 7.957 0.200
1977–1991 7.523 7.748 7.683 0.592
1992–2006 6.596 6.648 6.648 0.624
Expenses 1962–1976 0.009 0.009 0.007** 0.002
1977–1991 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.585
1992–2006 0.015** 0.014 0.014 0.004
Turnover 1962–1976 0.837* 0.642 0.491 0.002
1977–1991 0.680 0.823 0.850 0.091
1992–2006 0.856** 0.953 0.948 0.078
We present the mean of several characteristics of mutual funds separated into three groups of coskewness:, S includes the 15% of the funds with the most negative
coskewness, S+ the 15% of those with the most positive coskewness, and S0 the rest of the funds. TNA is the closing market value of securities owned, plus all assets, minus all
liabilities. We take logs and multiply by 10,000 and also divide the data by the mean of the market size of the funds in each period. The variable Expenses shows the expense
ratio (over the calendar year), that is, the percentage of the total investment that shareholders pay for the mutual fund’s operating expenses. Turnover is the turnover ratio of
the fund (over the calendar year), that is, the minimum of aggregate purchases of securities or aggregate sales of securities, divided by the average TNA of the fund.
* Indicates the rejection, at 90%.
** Indicates the rejection, at 95%, of the null hypothesis of the equality of means between S and S0, or between S+ and S0. The last column, presents the equality test for the
means of the groups S and S+.
Table 11
Relation between characteristics of funds and coskewness.
Variable Marg. Prob. p-Val. Variable Marg. Prob. p-Val. Variable Marg. Prob. p-Val.
S = 1 S = 1 S = 1
Panel A: 1962–1976 Panel B: 1977–1991 Panel C: 1992–2006
Intercept 1.029 0.533 Intercept 1.485 0.215 Intercept 1.651 <0.000
TNA 0.042 0.79 TNA 0.069 0.534 TNA 0.011 0.626
Turnover 1.239 0.01 Turnover 0.604 0.025 Turnover 0.359 <0.000
Expenses 84.69 0.317 Expenses 27.433 0.487 Expenses 9.361 0.221
DB1 1.508 0.075 DB1 0.958 0.01 DB1 0.959 <0.000
DB2 0.523 0.354 DB2 0.876 0.018 DB2 0.22 0.094
S+ = 3 S+ = 3 S+ = 3
Intercept 1.513 0.42 Intercept 1.58 0.066 Intercept 1.332 <0.000
TNA 0.2069 0.193 TNA 0.04 0.643 TNA 0.005 0.797
Turnover 0.452 0.541 Turnover 0.207 0.302 Turnover 0.1603 0.007
Expenses 301.19 0.006 Expenses 4.268 0.902 Expenses 3.971 0.585
DB1 1.11 0.368 DB1 0.379 0.314 DB1 1.423 <0.000
DB2 1.426 0.003 DB2 0.687 0.034 DB2 0.131 0.186
Number of obs. 169 Number of obs. 411 Number of obs. 4688
Wald v2 (10) 28.53 Wald v2 (10) 23 Wald v2 (10) 345
Prob > v2 0.0015 Prob > v2 0.0107 Prob > v2 <0.000
Log likelihood 121.4 Log likelihood 324.51 Log likelihood 3658
Pseudo R2 0.115 Pseudo R2 0.034 Pseudo R2 0.05
The table reports results of a multinomial logit analysis for individual funds in which the dependent variable equals one if the coskewness of the fund belongs to the 15% of
the funds with the most negative coskewness and equals three if the coskewness of the fund belongs to the 15% of those with the most positive coskewness, and zero
otherwise (this is the comparison group). TNA is the closing market value of securities owned, plus all assets, minus all liabilities. We take logs and multiply by 10,000 and
also divide the data by the mean of the market size of the funds in each period. The variable Expenses shows the expense ratio (over the calendar year), that is, the percentage
of the total investment that shareholders pay for the mutual fund’s operating expenses. Turnover is the turnover ratio of the Fund (over the calendar year), that is, the
minimum of aggregate purchases of securities or aggregate sales of securities, divided by the average TNA of the fund. DB1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the fund
belongs to Aggressive Growth and DB2 is equal to one if the fund belongs to Growth Income. When both dummies are equal to zero the funds belong to Long Term Growth.
Number of obs. indicates the number of funds available for that time period. This table also shows the Wald test for testing equality of logit coefficients and the pseudo R2 for
the regressions.ported in millions of dollars; logs are taken and multiplied by
10,000. Given that mutual fund sizes have been growing with time,
in order to achieve a good measure of the relative size of each mu
tual fund, the data is divided by the mean of the market size of the
funds in each period. Turnover is the turnover ratio of the fund
(over the calendar year), that is, the minimum of aggregate pur
chases of securities or aggregate sales of securities divided by the
average TNA of the fund. The variable Expenses shows the expense
ratio (over the calendar year), that is, the percentage of the total
investment that shareholders pay for the mutual fund’s operatingColumns 3, 4, and 5 report the mean of every characteristic in each
period. The equality of the means has been tested and (**) indicates
the rejection, at the 95% level of the null hypothesis, of the equality
of means between (S ) and (S0) or between (S+) and (S0). The last
column presents the equality test for the means of the groups
(S ) and (S+). Thus, for the first characteristic analyzed, TNA, and
for all periods, it is smallest for funds managing the negative
coskewness (funds in groups (S ). However, the mean equality test
indicates that the average sizes are not statistically different
among the three groups of coskewness. Expenses for funds in (S+)
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Feare the lowest in the first period, the means being statistically dif
ferent. In the last period, Expenses for the funds in (S ) are higher
than in the rest. Finally, the Turnover mean is statistically different
between the groups (S ) and (S0) in the last period, being lowest for
funds with a negative coskewness. Moreover, in all periods the
Turnover mean is statistically different between (S+) and (S ).
The univariate analysis indicates some differences related to
coskewness in the characteristics of funds. To clarify the influence
on the coskewness of all these characteristics together, a logit anal
ysis is performed. Logit can be viewed as a generalization of the
linear regression model to situations where the dependent variable
takes on only a finite number of discrete values. Thus, the depen
dent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the fund belongs
to the 15% of the data with the most extreme negative coskewness
(S ), three if the fund belongs to the 15% with the most positive
coskewness (S+), and two for the rest, that is S0 (the comparison
group). The reason for a logit analysis is to estimate the probability
of a fund having a significant coskewness conditional on the
explanatory variables. The negative (positive) sign of the coeffi
cient of a characteristic indicates that this characteristic has a neg
ative (positive) impact on the probability of significantly managing
coskewness.
In addition to the characteristic considered in the previous uni
variate analysis and in order to address the different role of fund
categories in the coskewness observed in Table 4, an explanatory
variable is included: a dummy variable equal to one where the
fund belongs to Aggressive Growth (DB1) and another dummy var
iable equal to one where the fund belongs to Growth Income (DB2).
When both dummies are equal to zero the funds belong to Long
Term Growth.
There are two main results from Table 11 for the last two subs
amples (Panels B and C).20 First, increasing the turnover ratio of the
funds decreases the probability of having a significant negative
coskewness and increases the probability of having a significant po
sitive coskewness. One interpretation is that fund managers who are
managing the coskewness and profiting from the coskewness spread
are managing funds more passively. Second, being an Aggressive
Growth fund increases the probability of having negative coskew
ness and decreases the probability of having a positive and signifi
cant coskewness. Finally, the TNA and the expense ratio are not
significant variables in explaining the coskewness of the funds.
5. Concluding remarks
Recent asset pricing studies show that systematic skewness is
important and that it helps to explain the time variation of risk
premiums. This paper explores the role of coskewness in the anal
ysis of mutual fund performance evaluation by examining a sample
of 6819 equity mutual funds between January 1962 and December
2006.
The results demonstrate that incorporating a coskewness factor
as an additional variable increases the explanatory power of the
model in both an unconditional and a conditional framework.
The coskewness factor is significant even when factors based on
size, book to market value, and momentum are included. There
fore, failure to consider systematic skewness could create a poten
tial problem of specification that could bias the risk adjusted
return obtained by mutual funds, providing investors with inaccu
rate information about the past performance of mutual fund
managers.
20 The great difference in the number of available funds during the last two periods
and the first one (169, 411, and 4688 observations respectively) allows more
confidence in the results obtained from the latter two periods.A highlight of this analysis is that, in general, there is evidence
significant changes in mutual fund performance when system
ic skewness is taken into account. The sign of the variation in
e performance is determined by the loading on the coskewness
ctor. Thus, if the beta of the coskewness factor is positive, indicat
g greater exposure of the fund to assets with negative coskew
ss, the adjusted alpha will decrease, whereas a negative
ading in the coskewness factor increases the alpha. These
anges in performance are statistically significant in 80% of the
utual funds sampled when the coskewness is introduced in the
PM, and are statistically significant for between 20% and 40%
the FF4 model. Furthermore, a ranking based on risk adjusted
turns without considering coskewness will generate a mislead
g classification and may have serious implications for other mu
al fund research where performance ranking is required, such as
rformance persistence studies or studies of investors’ selection
ility and flows of mutual funds.
Finally, this paper documents that once managers have decided
employ a certain policy of coskewness, betting on assets with
sitive or negative coskewness, they continue with that policy
er time. The next step identifies which class of funds uses one
licy or another, through a logit analysis. Some fund characteris
s are related to the likelihood of managing coskewness: the
rnover ratio the fund managers who are managing the coskew
ss and profiting from the coskewness spread are managing the
ore passive funds and the category indicator.
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